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DISCOVERY IN STATE AND FEDERAL
SMCRA PROCEEDINGS
G. DANIEL KELLEY, JR.*
STEPHEN M. TERRELL**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 ("SMCRA"),'
establishes a pervasive system regulating the surface mining industry under which
SMCRA adjudicatory proceedings can occur both in the federal enforcement of
state or federal programs and in the state enforcement of state programs. Dis-
covery rules have been promulgated by the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement ("OSM") for federal proceedings and adjudicatory proceedings
under state programs.2 State discovery rules applicable to state enforcement pro-
ceedings may vary from one state to another and can differ from the federal
rules. Furthermore, no single set of discovery rules is applicable to all types of
SMCRA adjudicatory proceedings. Such proceedings can vary widely, encom-
passing permit hearings, assessments and notices of violations hearings, hearings
on cessation orders, proceedings for suspension or revocation of permits, dis-
crimination hearings, bond release hearings, and possibly certain areas unsuitable
hearings. Each has its own discovery considerations.
This Article presents an overview of the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which have been incorporated into the OSM discovery
regulations with an "eye" to potential variations occurring under state programs.'
* Partner, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Indiana; A.B. 1962, American University
Hanover College; J.D. 1967, Indiana University.
** Partner, Ice Miller Donadio & Ryan, Indianapolis, Indiana; B.A. 1974, Ball State University;
J.D. 1980, Indiana University.
This work originally appeared as part of the Eastern Mineral Law Foundation's Special Institute
on Surface Mining (Arlington, Virginia, Mar. 21-22, 1986). Copyright 1986 by the Eastern Mineral
Law Foundation.
, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 to -1328 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2 See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.1130 to -4.1141 (1986).
1 For example, Indiana, in 310 IND. ADozmi. CODE § 05.1-13 (1986), makes the discovery pro-
visions of Rules 26-37 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure applicable to administrative adjudicatory
hearings although this was unnecessary since the discovery rules already applied to "proceedings before
administrative agencies" through Trial Rule 28(F).
In the Illinois regulations, the OSM discovery regulations were basically followed. ILL. ADmN.
CODE § 184.21 (1986). This, of course, will make Illinois administrative discovery procedures sub-
stantially different from Illinois civil practice discovery techniques which, for example, still retain the
1
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The fundamental differences between a court and an administrative agency, par-
ticularly as to inherent powers and evidentiary matters, also will be considered.
Furthermore, the interaction of the Freedom of Information Act with OSM reg-
ulations and the federal rules will be highlighted. The reader is cautioned that
this Article is not an in-depth analysis but is merely intended to heighten aware-
ness.
II. AGENCY POWERS RELATING TO DiscovERY AND SUBPOENAS
The beginning point of analysis for most administrative law questions involves
authority or delegated powers. In the context of discovery, some case law has
questioned the power or authority of an administrative agency to require pretrial
discovery under particular statutory provisions. 4 When considered with the case
law concerning the restricted subpoena power of an agency, these cases could
present difficult problems as to non-party discovery.
In Federal Maritime Commission v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co.,5 the Com-
mission's pretrial discovery procedures were found invalid as unauthorized absent
express statutory power and pursuant to the general rulemaking power granted
under the enabling statute. 6 The court held "that there inheres in discovery pro-
cedure involving the prehearing production and copying of documents, a potential
impact upon litigants so much greater than that associated with ordinary pro-
cedural rules, that the failure of Congress to affirmatively authorize the same
should be taken as a deliberate choice."
7
In the same vein, it is a well-accepted principle that an administrative agency
only has the subpoena power authorized by statute.' Significantly, the Admin-
distinction between discovery and evidentiary depositions.
Kentucky's discovery provisions are found at 400 Ky. Aom. REcs. 1:030, 1:040, and 1:050
(1986). 405 KY. Anmvr. REs. 1:020-7, 3:015-7, and 7:090-5 (1986) require recognition of evidentiary
privileges at the hearing.
Alabama appears to have incorporated the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure which presumably
include discovery rules. See ALA. ADmn, . CODE r. 880-X5A-.36. Alabama also applies the same
general rules of evidence to the administrative hearings as are applicable in Alabama's state courts.
See 800-X-5A-.30(2).
4 See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors Inc., 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
915 (1971); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964);
Louisville Builders Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1961).
Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255.
Some courts have indicated that this decision has been eroded. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
United States Dep't of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Whatever the case, the parties
must exhaust administrative remedies before attempting to get the matter into federal court in an
enforcement proceeding. See Uniroyal, Inc. v. Marshall, 579 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1978).
7 Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d at 260. See Louisville Builders Supply Co.. 294 F.2d
333; NLRB v. Interboro Contractors Inc., 432 F.2d 854.
1 See generally I Kocu, AD1AmsTRaAnvE LAW AND PacTIcE § 5.32 (1985).
[Vol. 89
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istrative Procedure Act contains no special grant of subpoena power to agencies. 9
Under section 1211(c) of SMCRA, the Secretary of OSM is authorized to
"conduct hearings, administer oaths, issue subpoenas, and compel the attendance
of witnesses and production of written or printed material as provided for in this
Act . . .... " Section 1264(e), regarding rehearings, authorizes the hearing officer
to:
subpoena witnesses, or written or printed materials, compel attendance of the
witnesses, or production of the materials, and take evidence including but not
limited to site inspections of the land to be affected and other surface coal mining
operations carried on by the applicant in the general vicinity of the proposed
operation .... 1
This language is essentially repeated in section 1269(h) concerning bond release
hearings, 2 but not in other hearing sections relating to permit revocation 3 or
notice of violation assessment hearings. 14 This omission is probably unimportant
because of the general subpoena power provided for in section 1211(c) of SMCRA.
The Act does not give prehearing subpoena power to the agency but this is prob-
ably of no consequence as to permittees (except in extraordinary situations) be-
cause of the broad inspection powers of the regulatory authority and OSM under
sections 1267 and 1271.1
The authority may be questionable for regulations allowing prehearing dis-
covery as to non-permitees or non-parties as well as for the validity of any such
subpoena which may issue. Such questions probably will arise in enforcement
proceedings before district courts having personal jurisdiction.
The OSM regulations basically have no counterpart to Rule 45 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which does not apply to administrative proceedings.
As the Advisory Committee on Rules noted, Rule 45 "does not apply to the
enforcement of subpoenas issued by administrative officers and commissions pur-
suant to statutory authority. The enforcement of such subpoenas by the district
courts is regulated by appropriate statutes.' '1 6 There is no enforcement provision
in SMCRA except for section 1271(c), 17 which does not seem specifically applicable
to the subpoena power. Federal question jurisdiction probably could be established
for the enforcement of an OSM-issued subpoena. Based on the general subpoena
See 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1982).
10 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c) (1982).
11 Id. at § 1264(e).
12 Id. at § 1269(h).
,3 Id. at § 1275(d).
, Id. at §§ 1268(b), 1271.
" Id. at §§ 1267, 1271.
6 FED. R. CwV. P. 45 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules).
17 30 U.S.C. § 1271(c).
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powers in SMCRA, if an agency has subpoena power other than for hearings,
there appears to be no geographical limitation to this power. However, the reg-
ulations in the general provisions of 43 C.F.R., subpart B, provide that a witness
only "be required to attend a deposition or hearing at a place not more than
100 miles from the place of service"'" and that "witness fees and mileage shall
be paid by the party at whose instance the witness appears." 1 9
In state proceedings, parties are limited as to discovery or even evidentiary
hearing matters occurring out-of-state. In court proceedings, many states authorize
depositions to be taken out-of-state while also providing special procedures to
allow for foreign state proceedings to be enforced in the state. 0 These statutes
or rules do not seem to contemplate administrative proceedings; therefore, under
most state laws, it is unlikely that discovery proceedings occurring out-of-state
can be enforced.
21
III. CoMPARING Tmh FEDERAL CIvIm DIscovERY RuLIES TO REGULATION 4.1130
The easiest manner in which to consider discovery issues is by comparing
discovery methods provided for under the SMCRA regulations (i.e., depositions,
interrogatories, production of documents, and requests for admission) to the cor-
responding federal discovery rules. No meaningful regulatory history exists ex-
plaining the reasoning for the differences between the regulations and the federal
rules, other than the reference to the stated purpose of the original discovery
regulations set out in the Federal Register comments: "Some of the commenters
indicated that they were in agreement with a stated purpose of the discovery rules,
i.e., to avoid confusion when general Federal civil discovery rules were made
applicable to the specialized procedures and terminology of Office of Hearing
and Appeals hearings on surface coal mining matters." 22 These commenters appear
to have recommended that the general provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures relating to discovery be incorporated by reference. However, the OSM
and the Secretary of Interior rejected the comments stating:
[Section] 4.1142 was deleted in order to avoid any confusion which might have
arisen in trying to determine what discovery procedure to follow. The discovery
procedures to be used in proceedings before the administrative law judges under
the Act are set forth in §§ 4.1130-41. However [these rules] track closely the
language of the "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" and it is the intention of the
Department that, where possible, in interpreting these rules, the body of case law
11 43 C.F.R. § 4.26(a) (1986).
19 Id. at § 4.26(c).
21 See UNIF. INTERSTATE & INT'L PROC. ACT, §§ 3.01, 3.02, 13 U.L.A. 388-91 (1986).
21 See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text and notes 75-78 and accompanying text for a
discussion regarding FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 30.
- 43 Fed. Reg. 34,379 (1978).
[Vol. 89
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regarding discovery which has evolved under the "Federal Rules" be applicable
to the discovery problems arising under this Act.?
A. Timing
Regulation 4.11312A provides for discovery after the initiation of the pro-
ceeding, and only limits the time for discovery to the extent that it "does not
interfere with the conduct of the hearing." 2 Regulation 4.1132 does not specif-
ically allow a hearing officer to enter orders as to the planning and termination
of discovery deadlines. Most discovery limitation orders under the federal rules
are pursuant to the pretrial procedure of Rule 16, which is not incorporated in
the regulations. Rule 26(f), relating to discovery conferences, also is not included
in the regulations. This could raise questions as to the authority of the hearing
officer to order disclosure of witnesses for the hearing. However, the prehearing
conference reference under Regulation 4.1121(b)26 might be used even though the
subject of timing of discovery is not set forth.
B. Scope of Discovery
Regulation 4.113227 concerning the scope of discovery, is modeled after Rule
26(b) with certain exceptions. The rules as to privilege and work product, the
most widely litigated aspects of Rule 26, are followed in Regulation 4.1132. Oth-
erwise, discovery is limited only to the extent that "information sought [must be]
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.'"'2 Of course,
even to the extent that a state has adopted the federal regulations, the rules of
evidence probably will be governed by the administrative procedure act of the
particular state. To varying degrees, such acts have adopted the common law
rules of evidence29 but such evidentiary rules could differ from the rules of evi-
dence pursuant to the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.3 0 Hence, the dis-
covery limit of "leadfing] to the discovery of admissible evidence" may vary
depending on applicable state law.
C. Privileges Generally
The regulations have brought into play privileged matter and work product
at least to the extent of discovery proceedings. The Federal Administrative Pro-
2 Id.
43 C.F.R. § 4.1131 (1986).
5 Id. at § 4.1132.
Id. at § 4.1121o(b).
27 Id. at § 4.1132.
28 Id.
See supra note 2.
5 U.S.C. § 551 to -576 (1982).
19871
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cedure Act provides only for the exclusion of "irrelevant, immaterial or unduly
repetitious evidence," and the common law rules of evidence do not control.3 '
Indeed, the agency decision may rest solely upon hearsay evidence 32 although this
may not be so in state proceedings.
33
Difficult issues may arise in the area of privileges (e.g., attorney-client and
governmental privileges not based on constitutional grounds). Most of these priv-
ileges are evidentiary considerations and are procedural rather than substantive
matters.
To what extent is an agency not bound by common law rules of evidence at
its hearings? Is it bound by evidentiary privileges? What is the effect of discovery
regulations which protect privileged information? Case law under Rule 26(b) de-
velops common law privileges; 34 however, such case law and rules are not ap-
plicable to administrative proceedings. 31
The concept of matter "not privileged" under Rule 26(b)(1) is basically an
adoption by the federal rules of the common law of evidentiary privileges. Hence,
the same privilege rules apply both to discovery and trial. 6 Rule 26(b) applies
equally to discovery and evidentiary depositions, as does Regulation 4.1132(a).
Since Regulation 4.1132(a) is modeled after Rule 26(b), the common law of priv-
ileges may be applicable to administrative discovery and hearings.
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,37 the United States Supreme Court held that
communications within the attorney-client privilege are protected from a tax sum-
mons issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. section 7602, as are matters within the work
product privilege. In determining the protection afforded by the attorney-client
privilege, the Court looked to Federal Rule of Evidence 501. However, it is dif-
ficult to imagine the applicability of Rule 501 except as it might come into play
because Rule 81(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to "proceedings to compel the giving of tes-
timony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued by an
officer or agency of the United States . . .,38
31 Id. at § 556(d).
32 See Steadman v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 450 U.S. 91, reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 933
(1981).
" See Burns v. State Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 250 Ind. 696, 238 N.E.2d 663
(1968); Indiana St. Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Levin, 247 Ind. 186, 213 N.E.2d 897 (1966).
34 See FED. R. Evm. 501.
35 See FED. R. Evim. 1101.
- See Stiftung v. Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom. 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967).
37 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
31 FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3).
[Vol. 89
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The Supreme Court apparently will read into statutes concerning adminis-
trative subpoenas "the traditional privileges and limitations"3 9 unless the legis-
lative history indicates otherwise. Regardless of the result, the requirements or
privileges "relating to evidence or procedure apply equally to agencies and per-
sons."40
Under state law, the applicability of privileges to administrative proceedings
may be less troublesome since some states have made rules of evidence applicable
to any proceeding in which testimony or evidence can be compelled.
4
1
D. Executive Privilege-Freedom of Information Act-Work Product
Probably the most widely encountered privilege in SMCRA discovery matters
is the governmental privilege. In light of the fact that state law has not developed
to the extent of federal law, most states probably will look to the federal law
for guidance.
The area of governmental privilege is further complicated by the existence of
the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). 42 The more important exceptions to
FOIA tie into the common law of privileges through Rules 26(b) and (c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as in the history of the 1974 amendments
to FOIA and the demise of the initially proposed Rule 501 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, all of which coalesced during Watergate. 43 While ignoring the con-
stitutional nuances of executive privilege,44 federal courts have long recognized
an evidentiary and discovery governmental privilege under Rule 26(b) encom-
passing various subjects which cannot be capsuled in this Article.
4 5
The most common facet of this governmental privilege likely to occur in
administrative proceedings is the qualified executive privilege. Before the enact-
31 Id. at 398. See also United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714, reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 913
(1980).
(8 5 U.S.C. § 559.
" See CAL. EvrD. CODE § 901 (Deering 1986); Annot., 31 A.L.R. 4th 1226 (1984); FED. R.
EvID. 1101(c).
42 5 U.S.C. § 552.
41 See generally 23 C. WRIGHT & A. MIMER, FEDERAL PRACtiCE AND PROCEDURE § 5421 (1980);
FED. R. EvID. 501 (not enacted); Berger, How the Privilege for Governmental Information Met Its
Watergate, 25 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 747 (1976).
44 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421
U.S. 132 (1975), in which the Court stated:
Our remarks in United States v. ixon, were made in the context of a claim of "ex-
ecutive privilege" resting solely on the Constitution of the United States. No such claim is
made bere and we do not mean to intimate that any documents involved here are protected
by whatever constitutional privilege content the doctrine of executive privilege might have.
Id. at 151, n.17.
41 See generally 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 43, at § 2019.
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ment of FOIA, this privilege generally encompassed governmental documents used
or considered prior to the making of a formal decision or policy, with the possible
exception of factual matters contained in the documents. 46 Additionally, the dis-
coverability of the results of law enforcement investigations, including statements
of witnesses and other documents, were determined using a balancing approach.
In Machin v. Zuckert,47 an injured crewman sought a report prepared by the Air
Force following an airplane crash. The court held that the privilege was applicable
only to conclusions and recommendations on policy matters, but not to mechanics'
opinions on the cause of the crash.
In 1966, FOIA was enacted.48 The primary exemptions which can be expected
in OSM-type proceedings are set out in section 522(b)(5) of FOIA, exempting
"inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums, ' 49 and in section 522(b)(7), con-
cerning investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes. Subse-
quently in 1974, Exemption 7 was enlarged and liberalized to its present form. 0
At first, it was unclear whether FOIA had enlarged the common law of govern-
ment privileges. Obviously, Exemption 5 is closely related to the common law
executive privilege.51
Initially, the Supreme Court found that it is "not clear that Exemption 5
was intended to incorporate every privilege known to civil discovery." ' 52 So far,
the Supreme Court has included within the government privilege agency mem-
46 See Stiftung v. Zeiss, 40 F.R.D. 318; Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Shasta Mineral &
Chemical Co., 36 F.R.D. 23 (D. Utah 1964); Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 459 (D. Ohio
1962).
, Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
41 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). The administrative procedure and remedy
to be exhausted before going into a federal district court for FOIA requests to the Department of
the Interior is set forth in 43 C.F.R. §§ 2.11 to -2.20 (1986).
,1 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). This section states: "[I]nter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the
agency .... " Id.
o Id. at § 522(b)(7). This section states:
[lnvestigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that
the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive
a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the
case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation,
confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative
techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel . ...
Id.
5 See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975) ("Ex-
emption 5 incorporates the privileges which the Government enjoys under the relevant statutory and
case law in pretrial discovery contexts . . ").
12 Federal Open Mrkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354 (1979).
[Vol. 89
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orandums, reports or working papers concerning "predecisional deliberations,"" a
or as referenced in the legislative history, "the working papers of the agency
attorney and documents which come within the attorney-client privilege if applied
to private parties."
54
In Federal Open Market Committee v. Merrill,5 5 the Court determined that
under Rule 26(c)(7), the qualified evidentiary privilege for trade secrets and con-
fidential commercial information in the government contract was within Exemp-
tion 5 of FOIA. The Supreme Court expressly declined to rule on the other
asserted basis for the privilege, including official government information, a dis-
closure of which would be harmful to the public interest 6 and Rule 26(c)(2),
concerning the requirement that discovery could be "only on specified terms and
conditions.
'5 7
The Supreme Court continued the applicability of Rule 26(b) and common
law privileges in United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp.." The Court held that
statements by two Air Force employees were "unquestionably intra-agency mem-
orandum or letters,"5 9 and further declined to differentiate between civilians and
Air Force employees. Since the statements were given in a safety investigation to
determine the proper course of corrective action, they were within the Machin
privilegeA0 The Court reasoned that this common law privilege, recognized in Rule
26(b), made the statements "not... available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with an agency." 6' Moreover, it appears the Court determined
in Weber Aircraft Corp. that the Exemption 5 was intended to incorporate
almost all privileges known to civil discovery.
However, there are subtle distinctions. For instance, in Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Grolier, Inc., 62 the Court held that attorney work product is exempt
from mandatory disclosure regardless of the status of the litigation for which it
was prepared. 63 At the same time, the Supreme Court recognized that prior to
the adoption of Rule 26(b)(3), the circuits were in disagreement as to whether an
attorney's work product prepared for one case could be made available in sub-
sequent litigation and whether this could vary depending on the demonstration
" NRLB v. Sear, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132.
'4 See Federal Open Mrkt. Comm., 443 U.S. at 355, n.15. See also E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 86-87, (1973).
" Federal Open Mrkt. Comm., 443 U.S. 340.
See the initial proposed form of FED. R. EvD. 501.
" FED. R. CIr. P. 26(c)(2).
" United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792 (1984).
Id. at 798.
61 Id. at 803.
Id. at 794-95.
F.T.C. v. Groiler Inc., 462 U.S. 19 (1983).
63 Id. at 28.
1987]
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of need. However, the Court emphasized that Exemption 5 relates to matters
which would be disclosed "routinely" or "normally"' ' upon a showing of re-
levancy, holding that:
Under the current state of the law relating to the privilege, work product
materials are immune from discovery unless the one seeking discovery can show
substantial need in connection with subsequent litigation. Such materials are thus
not "routinely" or "normally" available to parties in litigation and hence are
exempt under Exemption 5.61
As the Supreme Court originally held in National Labor Relations Board v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co.,66 a FOIA applicant's need for information cannot be taken into
account. When discovery is sought of matters which could conceivably come within
a work product situation when some degree of need or necessity might have to
be shown, discovery in front of the agency may be safer than a FOIA procedure.
It would appear that the Supreme Court is intent on closing the gaps and
creating as much similarity between civil discovery and FOIA as possible. In
Weber Aircraft Corp., the Court noted:
Moreover, respondents' contention that they can obtain through the FOIA
material that is normally privileged would create an anomaly in that the FOIA
could be used to supplement civil discovery. We have consistently rejected such
a construction of the FOIA .... We do not think that Congress could have
intended that the weighty policies underlying discovery privileges could be so easily
circumvented . . .67
Respondents also argue that their need for the requested material is great
.... We answered this argument in Grolier, noting that the fact that in a par-
ticular litigation a party's particularized showing of need may on occasion justify
the discovery of privileged material in order to avoid unfairness does not mean
that such material is routinely discoverable and hence outside the scope of Ex-
emption 5 .... Respondents must make their claim of particularized need in their
litigation . ..since it is not a claim under the FOIA.11
The Supreme Court has held that witness statements taken by agencies such
as the National Labor Relations Board in the course of investigating and bringing
an unfair labor practice charge, are protected pursuant to Exemption 7(a) of FOIA
since the production of such statements generally would interfere with enforcement
14 These words essentially come from the legislative history cited in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 n.16.
Groiler Inc., 462 U.S. at 27.
16 NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132.
67 Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. at 801-02 (citations omitted).




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 3 [1987], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol89/iss3/9
DISCO VERY
proceedings. 69 In addition to looking to potential intimidation of current em-
ployees, the Court noted that "[u]nlike ordinary discovery contests, where rulings
are generally not appealable until the conclusion of the proceedings, an agency's
denial of a FOIA request is immediately reviewable in the district court .... ,,70
Therefore, as to statements, the result is generally the same under Rule 26(b)(3),
FOIA, and Regulation 4.1132(c), except that the regulation does not give a party
or person a discovery right to his own statements.
The widely varying nature of SMCRA proceedings should be considered. The
term "law enforcement purposes" requires particular analysis and emphasis under
SMCRA proceedings. For instance, are permit denial hearings and bond release
hearings enforcement action? Probably, the discovery procedures in the latter two
instances more properly involve Exemption 5 issues while notice of violation pro-
ceedings and similar proceedings involve Exemption 7 issues. However, Exemption
5 issues are largely repetitive of Rule 26(b) and (c) issues with some additional
hurdles. Even though the quick entry into a de novo proceeding in a federal court
on issues under FOIA is appealing, as is the lure of recovery of attorney fees if
successful, other advantages, particularly on the merits of discovery issues, are
much more difficult to find. While the statements generally are still protected
under the work product rule pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3), this may not be the case
in all states even though the states' rules are patterned after the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, a non-agency employee statement might not be
an intra- or interagency document or memorandum.
E. Experts
A notable exclusion from the regulations is Rule 26(b)(4) concerning experts.
Again, the regulatory history does not support this omission. The Department
may not have perceived any difference between testimony as to fact and opinion.
This omission may be totally at odds with evidentiary considerations under ap-
plicable state law. Moreover, this absence in the regulations as to experts could
lead to the total obliteration of the distinction between experts obtained for the
specific hearing and those experts consulted only to assist in preparation of the
case.
F. Protective Orders
Regulation 4.1132(d)71 largely is patterned after Rule 26(c) concerning pro-
tective orders. The only real difference is that under the rule, the district court
presiding where a deposition is to be taken may make such orders. As previously
19 Robbins, 437 U.S. 214.
70 Id. at 238.
71 43 C.F.R. § 4.1132(d).
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noted, under SMlCRA there does not appear to be a geographical limitation to
a hearing officer's subpoena power as to discovery matters (except under 43 C.F.R.
section 4.26(a)). Subpoenas are issued upon written application of the party with
no apparent differentiation between a subpoena and a subpoena duces tecum.'2
No provision in the regulations corresponds to Rule 45, relating to the issue of
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum, both as to trials and depositions. Rule
45(d) expressly limits subpoenas for taking depositions and subpoenas duces tecum
to matters not protected by Rules 26(b) and (c). The regulations, do not contain
such express provisions, nor time limitations or designated places concerning non-
parties and the venue for which a non-party can make objections as do the federal
rules. A non-party, as well as a party, may have to seek relief pursuant to Reg-
ulation 4.1132(d), or face an exhaustion of administrative remedies problem. How-
ever, the enforcement of a subpoena for depositions will have to be by action
in a federal district court, presumably within the district or division where the
witness resides.
G. Sequence of Discovery
Regulation 4.1133, 73 concerning sequence of discovery, is the same as Rule
26(d), while Regulation 4.1134, 74 relating to supplementation of responses, is iden-
tical to Rule 26(e). As previously noted, Rule 26(f), concerning discovery con-
ferences, has been omitted from the regulations.
H. Certifications
Rule 26(g), relating to the signing of discovery requests, responses, objections,
and certifications by attorneys, is not included in the regulations. This absence
may result in abuse of discovery as well as problems with discovery responses
and objections under the regulations. Probably the most troublesome omission
from the regulations is the requirement that the attorney make certain the client
has made reasonable inquiry as to the matter sought in discovery. However, if
sanction powers are used properly by the hearing officer, this may be of no
consequence.
I. Preaction Depositions
Rule 27, concerning depositions before an action or pending appeal, has no
counterpart in the regulations. However, if truly needed, one might attempt to
make a case for the use of Rule 27, or a state counterpart, to the extent that
future proceedings are expected.
72 See Id. at § 4.26(a).
71 Id. at § 4.1133.
74 Id. at § 4.1134.
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Rule 29, addressing stipulations as to discovery procedures, also is omitted
from the regulations. This certainly reduces flexibility. Even though there is no
authority to make such stipulations, a stipulation should result in a waiver by a
party to an administrative proceeding.
K. Depositions
Rule 30, concerning oral depositions, has several important differences from
the corresponding Regulation 4.1137. 71 First, notices of deposition are to be taken
"without leave of the administrative law judge' 76 and a subpoena must be applied
for pursuant to a written motion, presumably under 43 C.F.R. section 4.26. In
addition to the normal matters, the notice of deposition must include "the matter
upon which each person will be examined." ' 77 The federal rules have no coun-
terpart to this regulation except Rule 30(b)(6) pertaining to corporate agency dep-
ositions, under which a party must designate "with reasonable particularity the
matters on which examination is requested." ' 78 Whether some degree of specificity
attaches to the regulation is unknown, as is the source of this requirement and
the reason for it.
The regulations omit Rule 30(b)(6) with respect to the taking of a deposition
of a corporation, governmental agency, or other entity. Obviously, the absence
of such a tool, particularly when dealing with an agency, could be extremely
burdensome and result in games of "hide 'n seek" with witnesses who have per-
sonal knowledge of matters.
The regulations also omit Rule 30(b)(5) allowing a motion to produce to
accompany a notice to take a deposition, Rule 30(b)(7) providing for telephone
depositions, and Rule 30(b)(4) allowing a deposition by other than stenographic
means. In addition, the Rule 30(c) requirement of noting objections as to pro-
cedural and substantive matters in the deposition, is not set forth in the regu-
lations.
Rule 30(d), concerning motions to terminate or limit the examination, is not
encompassed within the regulations. The regulations, with respect to the sub-
mission of the deposition to a witness for signing and changes, as well as cert-
ification and filing, are not as complete as Rules 30(e) and (f). Furthermore, the
regulations do not contain a provision as to any changes in form or substance
that a witness may desire to make. The regulations also have no counterpart to
71 Id. at § 4.1137.
,1 Id. at § 4.1137(a).
7 Id. at § 4.1137(a)(3).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(bl)(6).
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Rule 30(g), pertaining to the failure to attend or serve a subpoena and the charging
of expenses. Rule 31, concerning depositions upon written questions, is largely
duplicated in 43 C.F.R. section 4.1137. Both provisions are probably equally
useless.
Rule 28, relating to persons before whom depositions may be taken, has no
exact counterpart in the regulations, at least as to foreign depositions. Regulation
4.1137(b) 9 authorizes the deposition to be taken "before any officer authorized
to administer oaths by the laws of the United States or of the place where the
examination is held." The general rules in subpart B, made applicable by Reg-
ulation 4.1104,80 are somewhat ambiguous in Regulation 4.26 in which an ap-
plication is necessary for the issuance of a subpoena "requiring the attendance
of witnesses at hearings to be held before . . . [the administrative law judge] or
other officers .... "81 Presumably, "other officers" refers to notary publics. This
application procedure may conflict with Regulation 4.1137 in which depositions
may be taken "without leave of the administrative law judge."
L. Use of Depositions in Court Proceedings
Regulation 4.113882 is substantively equivalent to Rule 32 except at the be-
ginning where the regulation provides "so far as admissible," '83 instead of the
federal language of "so far as admissible under the rules of evidence." '84 The
regulation, as does the federal rule, makes a distinction between impeachment
evidence and substantive evidence. Regulation 4.1138(b) allows the deposition of
"an officer, director, or managing agent or a person designated to testify on
behalf of a public or private corporation . . . or governmental agency . . ."8s to
be used for any purpose. However, the corresponding provision under Federal
Rule 30(b)(6), is not included in the regulations. Obviously, this demonstrates the
in-depth understanding of the drafters of the regulations.
Finally, the entirety of Rules 32(b) and (d), concerning objections as to ad-
missibility of evidence and objections as to the form and notice, have been omitted
from the regulations. This leaves an administrative law judge in a substantial
quagmire in making rulings and objections as to the form of the deposition and
substantive evidentiary matters.
79 Id. at § 4.1137(b).
,o Id. at § 4.1104.
8I Id. at § 4.26(a).
u Id. at § 4.1138.
83 Id.
FED. R. Crv. P. 32.
95 43 C.F.R. § 4.1138(b).
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DISCO VERY
M. Interrogatories to Parties
Regulation 4.113916 is substantially similar to its counterpart in Rule 33, in-
cluding the allowance of interrogatories as to opinions or contentions which relate
to fact or law. However, Rule 33(c), concerning the option to produce business
records in response to an interrogatory, has been senselessly omitted. This om-
mission probably will create a substantial burden for an agency, particularly in
responding to interrogatories in permit proceedings.
N. Production of Documents
There are only two basic differences between Rule 34 and Regulation 4.1140.87
First, the regulation does not require a party to produce records maintained in
the usual course of business or to organize them to correspond with the categories
in the request for production. As a result, the scrambling of documents produced
may be a problem in discovery. Second, the section of Rule 34(c) stating that
the "rule does not preclude an independent action against" '88 a non-party for
similar relief, is omitted from the regulations. Some state rules, including Indiana,
specifically allow such an independent action as to non-parties. However, ac-
cording to the Advisory Committee under the federal rules, there are both "ju-
risdictional and procedural problems" which prevented the Committee from
recommending that such a provision be included in the rules.8 9 Obviously, a sub-
poena duces tecum, along with a deposition, can cure this problem as to non-
party discovery. However, permission to enter upon land and inspection of matters
other than documents would present a more difficult discovery problem which
may be insoluble at the administrative level, given the lack of authority to entertain
a bill in equity.
0. Physical and Mental Examinations
Rule 35, concerning physical and mental examination of persons, has been
omitted from the regulations. In cases involving discriminatory treatment of em-
ployees pursuant to section 1291 of SMCRA,1° such procedures may be useful,
at least in supporting an employer's reason for discharge or other treatment of
an employee. Many states also have not included similar provisions in that at the
time of the enactment of state programs, OSM was taking the position that this
provision was solely for enforcement by the Secretary.
Id. at § 4.1139.
" Id. at § 4.1140.
8 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c).
'9 FED. R. Crv. P. 34 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules).
30 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
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P. Requests for Admissions
Regulation 4.114191 is substantially similar to its federal counterpart, Rule 36,
except for two matters. First, under the regulations, a denial or a statement as
to the reason a party can neither admit nor deny a matter for which an admission
is requested must be under, oath. This requirement may result in more careful
attention to responses to requests for admissions. Second, the regulation concerns
"any specified relevant matter of fact," 92 while the federal rules counterpart allows
requests to admit "statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law
to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request." '93
This difference will allow the pre-1970 case law to resurface distinguishing a fact,
mixed law and fact, and an opinion.
IV. CONCLUSION
SMCRA has progressed through its early implementation stages, and is now
fully in place, as are the numerous approved state programs. Attention has shifted
from implementation to enforcement and, as it has done so, the focus has changed
to the workings of the administrative proceedings. As in all adjudicatory pro-
ceedings, the availability of discovery procedures is of vital importance. The ability
to obtain information to prepare a case is frequently more important to the final
outcome than the actual presentation of the case.
Under SMCRA, discovery is available for adjudicatory hearings. While similar
in many respects to the discovery rules provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the practitioner must be aware of the many differences. Furthermore,
the practitioner must recognize that alternative sources of information, such as
the Freedom of Information Act, exist and realize the potential benefits and draw-
backs of using these alternative sources.
Many unanswered questions remain as to the scope and extent of discovery
in adjudicatory proceedings under SMCRA, as well as enforcement powers con-
cerning such discovery. These questions will be answered only through the de-
velopment of case law or the promulgation of more finely-tuned regulations. In
the interim, the practitioner must consider these issues to effectively plan his
strategy and approach to SMCRA adjudicatory proceedings.
91 43 C.F.R. § 4.1141 (1986).
92 Id. at § 4.1141(a).
91 FED. R. Cxv. P. 34.
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